On November 5, 2026, the Arkansas Supreme Court ruled in H.C. v. Nesmith, No. CV-23-328, that the Arkansas General Assembly, the state's legislature, may revive civil claims even after the deadline to sue, known as the statute of limitations, has expired. The ruling overturns a long line of Arkansas decisions, which the dissenting justices trace back to 1846, holding that once that deadline passes, the defendant has a "vested right" to the defense, much like a property right, that the legislature cannot take away. The case began when four plaintiffs, who allege they were sexually abused as children between 1995 and 2007, sued James Nesmith during a temporary "revival window" the legislature created in the Justice for Vulnerable Victims of Sex Abuse Act. The trial court dismissed the suit as untimely, and the Arkansas Court of Appeals affirmed in February 2025, saying existing Supreme Court precedent left it no room to rule otherwise. The Supreme Court then took the case on a petition for review, where it remained pending for more than a year and a half, and it issued its decision two days after the November 3 general election, reversing the dismissal, vacating the Court of Appeals opinion, and sending the case back for further proceedings.
Writing for the majority, Justice Nicholas Bronni framed the case as a question of how far courts may go in overriding the legislature. A court may strike down a statute only when it clearly conflicts with the constitution, he reasoned, and the vested-rights rule never rested on constitutional text. He traced the rule to a 1933 decision that relied on a 1915 legal encyclopedia, and he concluded that an expired limitations period "does not confer a property right" because deadlines to sue are policy choices for the legislature. With the precedent set aside, the majority called the case "an easy case." Justice Courtney Hudson concurred, stressing that courts should depart from earlier decisions only rarely and explaining that she did so here because childhood sexual abuse is so often reported late, if ever. Two justices dissented. Chief Justice Karen Baker's dissent cited the line of cases running from 1846 through 2004. Justice Shawn Womack's dissent made the fuller case for the old rule: he argued that Arkansas has treated an expired deadline as a protected right for nearly two centuries, that the rule is grounded in the state constitution’s due process and retroactivity provisions, and that fading memories and lost records make old claims hard to defend fairly. Notably, the majority opinion contains no separate analysis of whether to overrule precedent, and its history begins in 1933 without discussing the 1846 decision on which the dissents rely.
What this means in practice is narrower than the headline suggests but still significant. The revival window has closed, since it ran from six to thirty months after August 1, 2023, so the decision does not open the courthouse to new claims. What it does is remove the limitations
defense for plaintiffs who filed in time. Some defendants obtained orders extending or pausing their time to respond until the Supreme Court ruled, and at least some of those orders set a deadline thirty days after the decision, so each defendant should check its own order now. The decision also matters well beyond the individuals accused of abuse. Because the Act permits suit against anyone who committed the abuse or whose wrongful conduct caused it, institutions such as religious orders, schools, dioceses, and other youth-serving organizations are within its reach, and with the deadline defense gone the contest shifts to the facts: what the institution knew, whether it caused the harm, who actually controlled the ministry or school, and how the passage of decades has affected witnesses and records. Institutions that often operate through related entities such as academies, foundations, and civil corporations, and that keep historic records across various locations and archives, should examine now how those entities are governed in practice, locate and preserve their records, and notify their insurers. Looking ahead, because the court's reasoning rests on the view that the legislature, not the courts, decides how long is too long to sue, nothing in it prevents the General Assembly from reopening a window in the future.
If you have questions about Nesmith or related matters, please contact Michael A. Airdo (mairdo@airdowerwas.com) or Yuri A. Klinkenbergh (YKlinkenbergh@airdowerwas.com).
This post is for general information only and is not legal advice.
